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Abstract: An extensive literature shows that managers’ withholding of bad news, an agency 
problem in corporate governance, plausibly causes stock price crashes. This literature, however, 
has not examined whether and how lending banks influence borrowing firms’ crash risk, despite 
banks’ advantageous role in corporate governance via their monitoring and funding functions. We 
fill this void in this study. To mitigate endogeneity, we exploit the staggered reforms in U.S. state-
level banking markets that gradually lift barriers for interstate branching. These deregulation 
events, which are exogenous to firms, represent historically important shocks to bank competition, 
and bank competition can fundamentally alter bank monitoring and funding behaviors. We find 
robust evidence that bank competition reduces firm crash risk, and the effect is stronger in 
scenarios in which bank monitoring and funding are likely to exert greater influences. Bank 
competition also mitigates abrupt divulgence of adverse information, suppresses earnings 
management, and improves reporting quality, which helps explain the decline in crash risk.                    
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1. Introduction 
Stock crash risk, manifested by the unusual firm-level stock price deep plunges, has been 
of keen interest to practitioners, academicians, and policy makers. Theorists generally agree that 
managerial opportunistic behaviors that conceal bad firm news constitute a major reason for firm-
specific crash risk. According to the bad news hiding argument, negative information is stockpiled 
for a prolonged time until being divulged all at once at a tipping point, leading to a precipitous 
price drop and thus crash (Jin and Myers 2006; Bleck and Liu 2007; Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian 2009; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009). Under this logic, crash risk in stock price of a 
firm hinges on the willingness and ability of its managers to withhold the disclosure of inferior 
message about the firm. Numerous studies have made continuous efforts, both theoretically and 
empirically, to identify a large number of factors that may influence managerial bad news hoarding 
behaviors and the consequent price crash risk. The areas explored are exceptionally vast, covering, 
among others, corporate disclosures (e.g., accrual management, accounting conservatism, 
financial reporting rule, format, readability, comparability, and opacity, and other information 
concealing mechanisms such as tax avoidance), managerial features (e.g., compensation structure, 
perks, manager ability, age, psychological biases like overconfidence), corporate governance (e.g., 
auditing, voting rights, internal control, institutional holding, analyst following, governmental 
supervision, political connection), market structure (e.g., liquidity, product market competition, 
short interest), and social norms (e.g., religion, social responsibility, mutual trust). 1  In this 
remarkably rich literature, however, there is a salient, and significant, negligence: creditors, in 
particular, banks. It is surprising that, after over a decade of intensive studies, we still have little 
 
1 Refer to Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) for a recent summary of related studies, and also some fresh evidence from 
Bao, Fung, and Su (2018), Kim, Lu, and Yu (2019), Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2019), Li and Zhan (2019), and Zhang, 
Guan, and Kim (2019), and many others.  
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knowledge about whether and how banks influence stock crash risk, given the fact that banks are 
an especially important stakeholder that exerts critical impacts on firms’ financing, investments, 
and operations. This knowledge gap motivates our study of the relation between banks and 
borrowing firms’ crash risk, as conducted in this paper. 
Our inquiry about the influence of banks on firm-level stock price crash risk is necessary 
and important because banks play a unique and critical role in corporate governance (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997), and better corporate governance aims to solve the agency problems that are the root 
of opportunistic hiding of negative firm information (Jin and Myers 2006).2 This role is peculiarly 
relevant to crash risk because banks, unlike other creditors from the public debt market, have an 
informational advantage in monitoring borrowing firms’ behaviors and also the flexibility of 
adjusting funding decisions to the firms. In other words, banks influence borrowers’ bad news 
accumulation and crash risk via monitoring and funding channels. To the extent that firms heavily 
rely on bank financing, these influences from banks can be significant.            
However, empirically examining the impact of banks on stock crash risk faces substantial 
challenges because their relationship is plagued by severe endogeneity problems. The foremost 
obstacle is that the causal direction is difficult to determine. On the one hand, borrowing firms 
may condition their intended bad news hiding behaviors on the lending banks’ strength of 
disciplines in monitoring and funding; On the other hand, banks may also base their decisions of 
lending and terms of monitoring (e.g., covenants) on the borrowers’ governance status including 
opportunistic news concealing. Meanwhile, potential omitted variables may be simultaneously 
correlated with both bank behaviors and firm behaviors. For example, it is possible that a market-
 
2 The bulk of research, especially empirical works, follows Jin and Myers (2006) who introduce the managerial bad 
news hiding theory in an agency theoretical framework. Hong and Stein (2003) suggest that with the lack of a 
mechanism to reveal bad news by pessimistic investors, crash risk builds up.  
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wide financial crisis makes bank loan terms especially tightened and at the same time makes it 
difficult for firms to disguise the worsened situation (or reduces the incentive for the managers to 
do so because the opportunistic cost is minimal during a recession). For these reasons, the inference 
from an association examination between, say, loan terms and stock crash risk tends to be limited.        
In this paper, we overcome these challenges by identifying exogenous shocks from a 
natural experiment that are likely to change bank monitoring and funding practices, and examining 
whether and how firms’ stock price crash risk also changes accordingly. Because these shocks 
affect banks only, and are largely independent of firm news disclosing practices, any change in 
firm behaviors can be attributed to changes in bank activities. The banking shocks in our natural 
experiment come from the interstate branching deregulation in the U.S. – the revolutionary reforms 
that lifted the restrictions to banks’ geographic expansion across state borders and fundamentally 
changed the U.S. banking markets. When a state relaxes the constraints to out-of-state branching 
to a larger extent, it brings higher level of entry threat into the state’s banking market, which 
substantially alters the competitive environment among banks. A significant literature has argued 
that bank competition fundamentally changes banks’ monitoring & screening and credit providing 
(e.g., Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Rice and Strahan 2010; Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas 2013; 
Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams 2016; Bai, Carvalho, and Phillips 2018), both of which are 
closely related to borrowing firms’ willingness and ability to manipulate information and hide bad 
news, and thus hold the potential to affect their stock price crash risk. Importantly, the bank 
deregulation process was uncorrelated with firms’ demand for credit or corporate governance 
(Kroszner and Strahan 1999; Black and Strahan 2002; Kerr and Nanda 2009; Rice and Strahan 
2010), providing an ideal laboratory for our investigation of the causal effect from lending banks 
to borrowing firms. 
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Given the novel research setting, however, the direction and amplitude of the potential 
influence of bank competition on borrowers’ stock price crash risk remain an open empirical 
question. The literature is divided on how competition in the bank market influences bank 
monitoring and bank funding, and it is unclear, given the changes in monitoring and funding, how 
firm managers respond to these changes in their information hiding behaviors. For bank 
monitoring, intensified competition helps more efficient banks win out, and the improved overall 
efficiency in the banking market tends to bring about better loan monitoring and screening 
(Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, 1998; Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen 2007; Bai et al. 2018). 
However, fiercer competition may also force banks to relax lending standards to compete for more 
loans, including the screening and monitoring efforts (Bushman et al. 2016), and distance can 
hinder the ability of a bank’s headquarters to monitor its subsidiaries or branches in a newly entered 
state (Brickley, Linck, and Smith 2003; Berger, Miller, Peterson, Rajan, and Stein 2005), which in 
turn may adversely affect the monitoring of loans and managing of risk. In theory, it is possible 
that, on average, banks’ monitoring function is improved and the difficulty of concealing bad news 
is heightened; It is also possible that a firm in a deregulated state has more options to borrow from 
out-of-state banks, which may provide a room for the firm to manipulate its information due to its 
greater bargaining power and before the remote lenders have a thorough comprehension of its 
business. Therefore, the net effect is uncertain. For bank funding, higher degree of contestability 
among credit providers in general is beneficial to borrowers, as reflected in increased credit 
availability and lowered funding cost (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; 
Demyanyk et al. 2007; Kerr and Nanda 2009; Favara and Imbs 2015). At the same time, with bank 
profit margins being squeezed by competition, banks’ capacity of risk absorption is undermined, 
which may reduce liquidity creation from the banking system (Petersen and Rajan 1995; Jiang, 
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Levine, and Lin 2019). Even if a firm is facing more credit options and more benign loan terms, it 
is still unclear whether it opts to hide bad news because the benefit (it does not have to beautify 
the information to compete for better loans) and cost (revealing more bad news won’t hurt 
corporate financing as much) of doing so are both reduced. Overall, theory suggests differing 
predictions for the effect of bank competition on bad news hoarding and crash risk.     
To provide empirical inference for the ultimate effect of bank competition on stock crash 
risk, we construct tests using the adoption events of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in different states of the U.S. as exogenous changes in bank 
competition that bring about plausible shocks to borrowers’ managerial opportunistic information 
concealing behaviors. We find robust evidence that increases in bank competition significantly 
lower borrowers’ stock crash risk, as manifested in the reduced likelihood of experiencing extreme 
price plunges and the decreased magnitude of conditional return skewness, both of which reflect 
the rare left-tail risk in stock returns (Bates 1991, 2000; Chen, Hong, and Stein 2001). 
Economically, after deregulation, borrowers in states that are completely open to interstate 
branching exhibit extreme price plunge likelihood 2.4% lower than in states with the most 
restrictions in out-of-state entry, a 14% decrease over the unconditional level of crash likelihood. 
Consistently, measures about stock return skewness also become significantly lower in more 
competitive banking markets. The evidence suggests that, with enhanced bank competition, the 
monitoring function of banks is improved and is also effective in constraining borrowers’ bad news 
hiding behaviors, and/or the change in credit provision also helps curb firms’ stock crash risk. 
Altogether, our findings point to a financial stability effect of bank deregulation and competition 
from the aspect of borrowing firms, at least for the firm-level crash risk.            
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We further show that the overall influence of bank competition on stock crash risk works 
through banks’ economic connections with firms and comes from both their monitoring and 
funding functions. We find that among firms with higher degree of bank dependence, the bank 
competition effect is significantly larger, suggesting that banks exercise their influences on firms 
via the borrowing-and-lending operations: If firms have more reliance on bank finance, they 
exhibit stronger reactions to a more competitive banking market by curbing their opportunistic 
news hiding actions. Furthermore, we find that if a firm’s information environment is more opaque, 
as reflected by high level of discretionary accruals, bank competition has a greater impact on the 
reduction of crash risk. Because monitoring plays an increasingly important role in informationally 
opaque firms, this evidence is consistent with the proposition of improved bank monitoring after 
bank deregulation. The literature also shows that bank deregulation substantially fosters 
innovations by providing more credits to innovative firms (Amore et al. 2013; Chava, Oettl, 
Subramanian, Krishnamurthy, and Subramanian 2013; Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe 2015), 
and thus the enhanced competition favors the funding to these borrowers. In line with this set of 
evidence, we find that more innovative firms, i.e., those with higher levels of R&D investments, 
have a significantly larger reduction in crash risk after bank deregulation. This finding echoes 
Amore et al. 2013, Chava et al. 2013, and Cornaggia et al. 2015, and further implies that increased 
credit support from bank competition attaches an opportunity cost that is relatively larger than 
potential benefit for managerial hoarding of negative information, making it no longer a 
worthwhile endeavor. We thus document the evidence for the influence of bank competition on 
crash risk via bank funding.         
To complete the logic chain from bank competition to stock crash risk, we make additional 
effort to confirm the role of bad news hiding which, in theory, is a critical link between bank 
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behaviors (monitoring and funding) and firm stock crash risk. We do so by directly examining the 
impact of bank competition on ex post incidence of abrupt divulgence of extremely unfavorable 
information and firms’ accounting manipulation behaviors. We find that reduced restrictive 
barriers in the banking market lead to a significant smaller likelihood of a sudden release of very 
bad news that could trigger a crash. We further document that increased banking market 
contestability causes less information-hiding accounting practices such as earnings management, 
and the occurrence of accounting restatement is also reduced subsequent to enhanced bank 
competition. The evidence suggests less frequent divulging of extremely negative information (i.e., 
accumulated bad news in the past) after a tipping point, and more transparent and truthful financial 
reporting practices for firms in states with more competitive banking market. This implication not 
only is consistent with the generally accepted idea that hiding bad news by managers is a key driver 
of stock crash risk, but also substantiates the economic logic that bank competition could influence 
firm crash risk via affecting accounting treatment of information and more generally corporate 
governance.  
By connecting bank competition with stock crash risk, our study contributes to these two 
large literatures. Our contributions are not merely the identifications of yet another determinant of 
stock crash risk and an additional consequence of bank deregulation, although these are certainly 
novel findings. In our opinion, establishing the links between bank market, managerial information 
concealing, and firms’ price crash is more important. These links are embedded in a broader 
network involving banking, accounting, and equity market. For crash risk research, our study 
opens a new window to the credit market, especially the banking industry, which is one of the most 
influential sectors for firms’ information disclosure and risk control due to its critical monitoring 
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and funding roles.3 This new aspect of examination, given our initial evidence documented in this 
paper, could potentially entail a series of issues from the bank market that may affect stock crash 
risk such as the concrete bank monitoring schemes (e.g., covenant violation) and funding decisions 
(e.g., loan re-contracting). These issues are to be further explored in future researches. As such, 
our work makes a significant complement to existing literature. Also, we emphasize the effect of 
market structure, a largely underexplored area in crash risk studies. This consideration is 
potentially insightful because most existing studies focus on the direct stakes held by stakeholders 
(e.g., investors), rather than the interactions among the stakeholders. Two recent papers from 
Chang, Chen, and Zolotoy (2017), who examine the liquidity-related trading microstructure of the 
stock market, and Li and Zhan (2019), who investigate the product market competition, are the 
only exceptions (to our best knowledge). We add new insights to this direction of research by 
examining the market structure from the credit market. Unlike Chang et al.’s (2017) and Li and 
Zhan’s (2019) works in which the market settings are firms’ stock and product trading platforms, 
our market structure subject is not directly related to the firms themselves, and for this reason, our 
evidence speaks to the transferring mechanism from outside stakeholders to the inside firm 
managers. 
For bank deregulation and bank competition research, our study helps answer the central 
questions in finance and economics about whether the bank system can stabilize the economic 
system, or more generally, whether financial market affects economic development in which risk 
is a critical concern. The banking literature has devoted extensive effort to examining these issues, 
but competition-related financial stability studies mostly take the perspective from the banking 
 
3 Liu, Ng, Tang, and Zhong (2018) suggest that investors reveal their pessimistic opinions through trading credit 
default swaps (CDS), which helps reduce crash risk. Their study, although explores the debt-related CDS market, does 
not speak to the banking sector and how creditors may influence managerial bad news hiding behaviors.  
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sector itself (Akins, Li, Ng, and Rusticus 2016; Bushman et al. 2016; Goetz, Laeven, and Levine 
2016), i.e., how bank competition affects bank risks, rather than borrowing firms’ risks. The 
perspective in our study supplements this literature because we focus on firms’ risks. Our empirical 
examination of borrowers is informative for the major bank competition-stability theory pioneered 
by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) in which the borrowers’ risks are emphasized, and we believe our 
work provides the first borrower-based evidence that is relevant to this highly influential 
theoretical hypothesis, although not a direct test. Our specific focus on crash risk is also of 
particular relevance to financial stability. Moreover, our study introduces the considerations from 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure, which have not been explored in existing bank 
competition studies. These considerations are important because our evidence suggests that banks 
may influence firms’ risks not only through changing the fundamental risk in corporate investment 
(as modeled in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)), but also through affecting the information and 
governance environment in an agency framework. A refined theory incorporating these additional 
features and the crash risk reducing effect of bank deregulation may better describe how a 
competitive bank market further helps stabilize the equity market and the whole economy.4 
The remaining of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literatures 
and develops the conceptual framework; Section 3 introduces measurement and research models; 
Section 4 reports baseline results; Section 5 provides evidence relevant to bank monitoring and 
funding roles; Section 6 specifically examines bank competition’s effect on firm information 
disclosure; Section 7 concludes.  
2. Related literature and conceptual development  
 
4 Our evidence about the relations between bank deregulation and firms’ bad news releasing practice and earnings 
management also supplements Jiang, Levine, and Lin (2016), Burks, Cuny, Gerakos, and Granja (2018), Dou, Ryan, 
and Zou (2018), and Tomy (2019). These studies examine how bank competition affects banks’ opaqueness, voluntary 
disclosure, accrual management, and discretionary reporting.  
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Crash risk research is surrounded by the key theoretical argument that the agency problem 
in corporate governance allows the possible managerial strategy to hide bad news for an extended 
period. The banking literature proposes an important delegated role of banks to monitor firms via 
their funding practice, and bank competition can largely alter bank monitoring and funding. The 
key link between bank competition and firms’ crash risk thus hinges on the premises that (i) bank 
competition changes bank monitoring and funding, and (ii) the change in monitoring and funding 
functions of banks engenders the change in bad news hiding behaviors in firms.      
2.1. Literature review 
2.1.1. Relevant research of stock price crash risk 
There has been a proliferation of empirical research on the agency conflict-based crash risk 
theory developed by Jin and Myers (2006), in which inside managers have information that outside 
stakeholders do not have, and the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders, when 
combined with opacity, motivates and enables managers to hoard bad news for their own benefit 
(Kothari et al. 2009). The hidden unfavorable private information piles up over time to a certain 
threshold beyond which the controlling insiders exercise an abandonment option (because the cost 
of absorbing further bad news exceeds the associated benefit) to release the accumulated bad news 
all at once, causing an abrupt downside crash of stock price. The literature has produced 
exceptionally rich evidence with regard to the determinants of stock crash risk. This line of 
research builds on the notion that the determining factors work through influencing insiders’ 
willingness and ability to withhold bad news.5  
Nevertheless, although the agency framework of crash risk theory critically depends on the 
connections between a firm and its investors, including both equity holders and creditors, only a 
 
5 One notable exception is Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2016) who propose that CEO overconfidence leads to larger stock 
crash risk due to CEO’s unknowingly ignorance of private negative news.  
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few papers directly examine the role of firm investors in affecting crash risk. The only studies that 
we are aware of are An and Zhang (2013), Callen and Fang (2013), and Kim, Li, Luo, and Wang 
(2019) who document that institutional equity ownership or foreign investor helps reduce stock 
price crash risk.6 These studies highlight the monitoring function of sophisticated institutions, 
consistent with other external monitoring factors such as analysts (Kim, Lu, and Yu 2019), auditors 
(Callen and Fang 2017), and regulators/government (Kubick and Lockhart 2016; Luo, Gong, Lin, 
and Fang 2016). In this line of research, the role of creditors, especially bank lenders, is an obvious 
void, despite that bank monitoring is a traditional and important mechanism to supervise firm 
behaviors. Moreover, banks’ funding activities further influence managers of borrowing firms, 
which is different from equity holders whose investing actions mainly take place in the secondary 
market and thus cannot directly affect corporate financing. Relative to bank market, the equity 
market is more likely to host transient investors whose decisions could place excessive emphasis 
on short-term performance and thus do not help solve the agency problem of bad news withholding 
(Chang et al. 2017). 
A recent study by Li and Zhan (2019) examines the product market competition and finds 
that intensified competition aggravates bad news hoarding and crash risk. For crash risk 
determinant studies, market competition, and more generally, market structure, is a much 
underexplored area. Competition among competing firms, as shown in Li and Zhan (2019), could 
influence opportunistic behaviors; Competitions among other stakeholders, in a same vein, could 
also affect managerial behaviors through altering the influencing role of the stakeholders. In our 
study, we take the perspective of competition among lending banks to examine how the bank 
 
6 Chen et al. (2001), Hong and Stein (2003), and Callen and Fang (2015) also take the perspective of equity investors 
by investigating how different opinions, especially those from short sellers, affect crash risk. These studies, however, 
do not consider potential agency problem and the associated managerial behavior. 
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monitoring and funding functions as changed by the competition influence borrowing firms’ bad 
news hoarding and crash risk. 
2.1.2. Relevant research of banking and bank competition 
Banks as significant creditors are generally large and active investors because they have 
substantial investments in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In protecting their investments and 
materialize the returns, banks can exercise the role of interfering in corporate governance because 
of their advantage in accessing borrowers’ inside information, which is unique to banks and 
unavailable to arm’s-length investors in the equity and public debt markets (Fama 1985; Rajan 
1992; Denis and Mihov 2003; Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008). Modern finance theory suggests 
critical functions of banks in screening, monitoring, and liquidity providing (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983; Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Allen 1990; Winton 1995; Kashyap, Rajan, 
and Stein 2002). These powers have the penitential to mitigate agency conflict, including the 
managerial concealing of expropriation activities from outsiders via withholding bad news that 
eventually leads to crash risk.  
Change in banking markets is an important source of banks’ change in screening, 
monitoring, and funding (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996). One of the most fundamental changes in 
the U.S. banking markets is the branching deregulation which greatly enhances the competition 
among banks. Numerous studies have used the branch banking reform as an experimental setting 
to examine the influences of financial markets on the quality of bank intermediation. A tradition 
view, as expressed by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Bai et al. (2018), is that a less restricted 
bank market for corporate control induces a more potent selection mechanism and a stronger 
incentive for performance that tend to improve the overall bank efficiency and lower the costs of 
screening and monitoring risky borrowers. Bushman et al. (2016), however, argue that greater 
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competition can pressure banks to relax lending standards, including lowered underwriting 
standards, less sensitivity of loan spread to credit quality, and less number of covenants. Hauswald 
and Marquez (2006) propose that, as competition increases, banks’ proprietary information 
acquisition may fall, leading to less efficient lending. In addition, Brickley et al. (2003) and Berger 
et al. (2005) suggest that a bank’s ability to monitor its branches and subsidiaries could be 
weakened by the increased distances (and potential complexity (Winton 1999)) that are likely to 
be induced by interstate branching, which may hinder the monitoring of borrowers’ risks. These 
opinions suggest a less stringent loan selection process that may undermine the efficiency of bank 
screening and monitoring.  
With regard to the funding provision function, a large number of studies document that 
bank competition generally improves credit availability and lowers credit cost (Jayaratne and 
Strahan 1998; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Demyanyk et al. 2007; Kerr and Nanda 2009; Favara 
and Imbs 2015). The basic rationale is that competition spurs innovation and boosts market 
efficiency by forcing price closer to marginal cost. This logic is confirmed by the findings of 
Amore et al. (2013), Chava et al. (2013), and Cornaggia et al. (2015) that innovations increase 
along with the staggered deregulation of banking activities. In contrast, Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
and Jiang et al. (2019) contend that competition among banks squeezes profit margins and depletes 
buffers against losses, which is harmful to relationship lending and liquidity creation, making 
credit-constrained firms less likely to be funded by bank creditors. To the extent that both screening 
& monitoring and funding channels are related with stock price crash risk, our study adds more 
insights to these disputes about the consequences of bank deregulation. 
In a more general setting, our study relates to the research about bank competition and 
financial stability, a fundamental, but unsolved, issue in economic research. Prior literature mainly 
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focuses on competition’s impact on banks’ own risk-taking behaviors, and offers competing 
predictions and evidence, both theoretically and empirically. A widely-held belief is banks with 
concentrated market power may abstain from too much risk exposure which could jeopardize their 
charter value, and bank competition reduces the franchise value and creates incentives for 
excessive risk-taking (Keeley 1990; Allen and Gale 2000; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 2000; 
Repullo 2004). This theory obtains supports from Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996), Gan 
(2004), and Bushman et al. (2016). In contrast, Boyd and Nicolo (2005) posit that the lack of 
competition may cause banks to charge higher interest rates, inducing firms to undertake riskier 
projects under a moral hazard motive which in turn increases the risk of banks. Akins et al. (2016), 
by checking banks’ engagement in risky activities, find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. 
Different from these existing studies, our empirical work takes the perspective of borrowing firms, 
not lending banks. Viewed differently, our study can be considered as a direct check of firm risk 
in the Boyd-Nicolo logic, which differs from Akins et al. (2016) who still examine bank risk. 
Moreover, when we examine firm risk engendered by bank competition, the nature of the risk is 
induced by managerial opportunism, i.e., an agency problem in which moral hazard arises. As such, 
our study provides a novel and concrete channel through which the borrowers’ risks interact with 
the lenders’, as suggested by Boyd and Nicolo (2005), and expands our understanding of the social 
desirability and economic role of bank competition.    
Another novel feature of our study is that, by connecting crash risk with potential bad news 
hiding activities, we provide inference for bank competition’s impact on information quality. 
Existing studies in this area focus their attention exclusively on banks’ information opacity, rather 
than the borrowers’. For example, Jiang et al. (2016) show that intensified competition reduces 
banks’ abnormal accruals and restatement frequency, and Burks et al. (2018) find that increase in 
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competition is associated with increase in voluntary disclosure of banks. More relevantly, 
Bushman, Wang, and Williams (2017) offer evidence that intense competition reduces agency 
costs (including the concealing of managerial expropriation activities) of banks in the form of loan 
loss provision (LLP) smoothing. These findings point to an improvement in bank information 
quality after deregulation. 7  Supplementing these studies, we provide evidence that bank 
competition could also improve borrowing firms’ information quality by curbing managerial 
concealing of negative firm information.    
2.2. Conceptual development: Bank competition could impact firms’ stock crash risk 
As discussed above, the literature generally agrees that bank competition holds the 
potential to alter the creditor monitoring and credit supplying conditions, which could influence 
the motive and ability of managers to conceal negative news – the critical driving factor of stock 
price crash risk in the agency theory framework. However, prior studies disagree on how 
competition among banks affects their monitoring and funding behaviors. If the screening & 
monitoring improving effect dominates, intensified competition spurs more stringent bank 
supervision and control that could largely shrink the room for managers’ information manipulation 
to conceal bad news in the borrowing firms; On the other hand, if heightened pressure from rivals 
forces banks to loosen borrower selection and private information acquiring processes to compete 
for loan customers, or the complexity and hierarchy of a banking conglomerate hinder efficient 
risk management, the bank screening & monitoring function could be weakened, granting greater 
leeway to firm managers to maneuver information disclosure. In a similar manner, if credits 
generally become cheaper and easier to obtain after barriers for bank competition are lifted, the 
 
7  Two relevant studies from Dou et al. (2018) and Tomy (2019) document that incumbent banks manipulate 
discretionary LLP to deter entry. However, they have opposite conclusions about whether increasing or decreasing 
LLP hinders the entry of potential rivals. 
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strength of bank disciplining is likely to be mitigated; If, on the contrary, the liquidity 
intermediation function of banks is hampered by bank competition, borrowing firms tend to treat 
lending banks’ concerns more seriously and accept stricter constraining terms. These bank funding 
factors could translate into managerial behaviors, but with contradictory effects.  
In the context of bank branching deregulation, bank competition manifests in the entry of 
out-of-state rivals into a local state. Relative to the pre-deregulation era, local firms face more 
potential lenders from other states after the deregulation. This brings in additional complexity that, 
on top of the undetermined effects from bank monitoring and funding, could further muddle bank 
deregulation’s impact on managerial treatment of negative firm news. On the one hand, 
geographical distance may cause out-of-state bank creditors to be more reliant on firm disclosures 
to collect information to monitor and control the borrowers (Chen and Vashishtha 2017), making 
it harder for firms to hide bad news; On the other hand, upon the entry of out-of-state banks, local 
firms may have more leeway for information manipulation because the newly arrived lenders do 
not know them well enough (at least at the initiation of the deregulation) and they tend to 
communicate with borrowers in more impersonal ways due to the paucity of soft information 
(Petersen and Rajan 2002). The expanded set of banks from which firms can borrow also grant 
borrowers’ enhanced bargaining power (Chava et al. 2013), which tends to alleviate their motives 
for a thorough disclosure of negative news. Moreover, the change of credit supply after 
deregulation does not affect managers’ withholding of bad news in an unambiguous way, because 
a, say, credit expansion that lowers the funding threshold and loosens the financing constraints 
may not automatically lead to a definite decrease or increase in managerial information concealing 
behaviors. After all, managers hide bad news for their own welfare, normally via a glamorized 
performance. A more lenient funding environment makes their lives easier by reducing cost of 
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capital and facilitating more profitable corporate investments. It is therefore not imperative to 
artificially inflate the performance by hiding unfavorable message. In other words, the benefit of 
beautifying firm information, especially for the purpose of applying for better loan terms, becomes 
minimal. At the same time, however, the lax credit background may simultaneously reduce the 
cost of hiding bad news as well, because, when facing more potential lenders competing for loans, 
a borrower’s funding conditions won’t be hurt that much even after its information concealing 
activities are detected. Similar arguments can be made in the scenario of credit shrinkage. 
In summary, bank competition, as induced by interstate branching deregulation, holds the 
potential to affect firms’ stock price crash risk. However, the eventual effect hinges on how the 
deregulation changes banks’ monitoring and funding functions, and how firms react to these 
changes. Overall, whether and how banks influence borrowers’ stock crash risk is ultimately an 
open empirical question.  
3. Research design  
We trace the firm-level effect of a major U.S. banking market deregulation process that 
captures focused changes in the degree of state-level bank competition, on the borrowing firms’ 
crash risk manifested in the distribution tails of their stock returns. We adopt rather standard 
approaches that have been widely used in the literature to measure bank competition and crash 
risk, and also to exam the former’s impact on the latter.  
3.1. Variable measurement 
3.2.1. Measuring bank competition  
To clearly identify the causal influence from banks to borrowers’ stock crash risk, we resort 
to the exogenous shocks to bank competition, which, as suggested in numerous studies, can affect 
managerial bad news concealing behaviors that cause price crashes. In our setting, these exogenous 
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shocks are characterized by the policy changes fostering competition in U.S. banking that alters 
the openness to out-of-state branching. Although banking deregulation of the U.S. financial sector 
started from 1970s, banks were generally not permitted to open branches across state lines until 
1994 with the passage of the IBBEA. While the IBBEA cleared the federal-level legal impediment 
for nationwide branching, it granted state legislatures the leeway to determine the extent of 
adoption. The varying extent of adoption is reflected in the conditions on the entry of out-of-state 
banks imposed by different states, and these conditions pertain to various barriers permitted by the 
IBBEA. Specifically, states are free to erect up to four restrictions on out-of-state entry: (i) For 
interstate bank mergers, states are allowed to impose a minimum age requirement, for a maximum 
of five years, for target institutions; (ii) A bank cannot open a new interstate branch under the 
IBBEA in states that do not expressly “opt-in” to this provision (iii) States can forbid an interstate 
merger transaction with any financial institution that holds deposits exceeding a certain threshold 
(e.g., 30% of the state aggregation); iv) Unless explicitly allowed by the states, any interstate 
acquisition of only a branch (or number of branches) of a bank, rather than the entire bank, is 
prohibited. All these restrictive terms are directly relevant to the openness of a local market, and 
can substantially change the competitive environment of banks.  
A unique feature of the IBBEA-induced interstate branching deregulation is that individual 
states can choose to impost none, some, or all of the out-of-state bank entry barriers described 
above, which effectively reflects the differing levels of bank competition and constitutes an 
advantage over the dichotomous indicators of the pre- and post-statuses of the adoption of a certain 
regulation. Moreover, many states have chosen to gradually remove the barriers on interstate 
branching, generating an especially rich series of event data corresponding to the staggered shocks 
to bank competition that affect different states (and the banks/firms therein) at different times and 
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to different extents. Rice and Strahan (2010) provide a detailed timeline for each deregulation 
event date, the number of barriers removed, and the remaining constrictions for all states (as well 
as the District of Columbia (D.C.)). Various researches, drawing on the political economy of these 
legislative reforms, have shown that the passages of deregulation policies are not characterized by 
clear patterns or endogenous dependence on product markets to which the borrowing firms belong 
(Black and Strahan 2002; Kerr and Nanda 2009; Amore et al. 2013). This institutional background 
provides an ideal setting to extract exogenous changes in bank competition that are driven by 
legislators in different states and less likely to coincide with other potential, omitted concurrent 
statewide affairs unrelated to branching deregulation (Leuz and Wysocki 2016).      
We exploit this exogenous setting to construct our measure for bank competition. 
Following Rice and Strahan (2010) and Bushman et al. (2016), we define an IBBEA deregulation 
index, denoted by RegIndex, for each state in each year, based on the number of existent interstate 
branching barriers among (i) requiring a minimum age of at least three years on target institutions, 
(ii) forbidding de novo interstate branching, (iii) applying a deposit cap less than 30%, and iv) 
prohibiting individual branch acquisitions. The index has possible discrete values ranging from 
zero to four, and takes a lower value after the removal of one or more restrictive barriers upon the 
passage of each deregulation legislation in a particular state, suggesting a more competitive 
environment among banks in the local banking market. Due to its novel institutional feature, 
numerous studies, e.g., Dick (2006), Zarutskie (2006), Cornaggia et al. (2015), Bushman et al. 
(2016), Burks et al. (2018), and Dou et al. (2018), have adopted the same measure to identify the 
effect of competition on banking markets. 
3.2.2. Measuring stock crash risk  
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 We follow prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2001; Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011a, 2011b) to 
estimate price crash risk by exploring the stock return characteristics, featuring two distributional 
properties: (i) The stock price crashes are firm-specific, reflecting firm-level managerial news 
concealing behaviors rather than the market-wide information shocks; (ii) The crashes should be 
rare but extremely impactful events, that is, they manifest in the stock return distribution tails, in 
particular, the left tail.  
 Specifically, to measure stock crash risk, we first filter out the market impact from the 
weekly return series for the stock of each firm, as shown below: 
  ,  =    +          +          +        +          +          +   ,   (1), 
where Rj,τ is the holding period return of week τ for a particular stock j, and RMτ is the 
corresponding market return. RMτ-2, RMτ-1, RMτ+1, and RMτ+2 represent the lead and lag market 
returns by one or two weeks. Utilizing weekly frequency and adopting extra lead and lag terms of 
market returns are to minimize microstructure noise, especially potential biases from 
nonsynchronous trading. Eq. (1) is estimated each year for each stock, and the firm-specific returns 
are embedded in the residual weekly returns εj,τ. We adopt its logarithmic form Wj,τ = ln(1 + εj,τ) 
and explore its distributional characteristics to estimate our stock crash risk measures. 
Our first crash risk measure CRASHj,t is the indicator of the occurrence of crash weeks in 
which the firm-specific weekly returns fall at least 3.2 standard deviations below the annual mean, 
corresponding to a 0.1% probability under normal distribution, i.e., a rare once-in-1000 left-tail 
event. CRASHj,t is coded one if we can identify one or more crash weeks in a given year t for a 
given stock j, and zero otherwise.  
Our second and third crash risk measures capture the high-moment property of the 
idiosyncratic stock returns, which utilize more distributional information and also reflect unusually 
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large price plunges. Specifically, as the second measure, for each stock j in each year t, we compute 
a negative conditional skewness measure NCSKEWj,t (representing negative coefficient of 
skewness) as shown below:  
       ,  = −   (  − 1)
 
   ∑   , 
     (  − 1)(  − 2)(∑   , 
  )
 
        (2), 
where n refers to the number of weekly returns in each estimation year. NCSKEWj,t essentially is 
the third moment of the distribution of firm-specific returns Wj,τ scaled by its standard deviation 
raised to the third power, multiplied by -1 in order to make higher value indicate larger degree of 
stock price crash. 
 The third crash risk measure DUVOLj,t, which also reflects the skewed nature of stock 
returns, is estimated as follows: 
      ,  = ln  (   − 1) ∑   , 
 
     / (   − 1) ∑   , 
 
       (3). 
 In the above, nu and nd represent, respectively, the numbers of weeks with idiosyncratic 
returns above (i.e., up weeks) and below (i.e., down weeks) the mean in each one-year estimation 
window. DUVOLj,t, estimated for stock j in year t, is the logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation on the down weeks to the standard deviation on the up weeks. Since this measure does 
not involve third moment, it is less likely to be driven by outlier observations but still effectively 
detects skewed distribution, with higher value corresponding to a more left skewness.      
3.2. Empirical model 
We assess how bank competition affects borrower’s stock crash risk in the context of the 
IBBEA adoption process across various states and along the time line, as in the following baseline 
model: 
    ℎ      ,  =    +            ,  +       ,  +        ,    +       ,     
                             +     ,    +         ,    +     _    ,    +       _    ,    
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                             +                   +                    +                                (4). 
In the model, the dependent variable is one of the ex post crash risk measures CRASHj,t, 
NCSKEWj,t, and DOVULj,t. We match these crash measures of each firm j with the state-level 
IBBEA deregulation index as of year t, i.e., RegIndexj,t, according to the locating state for the 
headquarters of the firm. As shown by Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), Dass 
and Massa (2011), and Amore et al. (2013), firms should be primarily affected by the branching 
deregulation in the states of their headquarters because of the easier information gathering and 
processing and the stronger propensity to borrow from local lenders. As such, our empirical 
investigation is at the firm level, which is different from most existing studies employing the 
IBBEA deregulation that conduct analyses at the state level. Amore et al. (2013) contend that firm-
level analysis is advantageous in its ability to control for unobserved time-invariant firm effects, 
and also to examine heterogeneous responses to deregulation within a given state. To facilitate 
such empirical examination, we add firm fixed effects into our model to mitigate potential omitted 
factor biases. We also control for year fixed effects to capture time-varying factors across different 
deregulation stages in different states. To the extent that the firm indicators differentiate firms in 
deregulating states from those in other states, and the year indicators mark the pre- and post-periods 
for each deregulation event, our model essentially compares the cross-event crash risk change in 
the state that experiences branching barrier-lifting event with the corresponding change around the 
event time in states without deregulation movements, thus highlights the impact on firm crash risk 
specifically from policy shocks. 
To further factor out the influences from time-varying firm characteristics, we follow 
Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, 2011b) to control for profitability measured by return 
on assets ROAj,t, natural logarithm of firm size SIZEj,t-1, leverage ratio LEVj,t-1, and market-to-book 
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ratio MBj,t-1. To be consistent with existing literature, we lag these variables by one year, except 
for the ROA measure which is estimated for the same year as crash risk.8 Other control variables 
relate to stock market attributes, including investor heterogeneity, past return performance, and 
past return volatility, denoted by DTURNj,t-1, MEAN_RETj,t-1, and SD_RETj,t-1, respectively. These 
factors predict stock crashes as shown by Chen et al. (2001). We estimate DTURN by the annual 
change in average monthly share turnover; MEAN_RET and SD_RET are proxied by the mean and 
standard deviation of weekly firm-specific stock returns, respectively. The Appendix provides 
definition details of these variables.  
4. Main empirical results  
4.1. Data and summary statistics 
Our sample includes all non-financial public firms with common stocks listed on U.S. 
equity markets. We require these firms to be headquartered in one of the states (and the D.C.) in 
the U.S., and identify the locating states of their headquarters according to 10-K filings on the 
SEC’s EDGAR (as augmented by the Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and 
Finance) in order to differentiate in-state (or local) firms from those in other states. Since the filings 
through EDGAR in 1994 and 1995 were associated with various phase-in periods for different 
types, we select the sample period from 1996 to 2016 to ensure accurate and sufficient 
identifications.9  We obtain the timing of each state-level IBBEA deregulation event and the 
RegIndex values before and after each event from Rice and Strahan (2010), and match the values 
to the local firms. To estimate weekly return-based crash risk measures (and the equity market-
related control variables), we obtain stock return data from CRSP and require a minimum of 30 
 
8  Prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2011a, 2011b) find that a firm’s profitability performance exhibits significant 
association with its stock crash risk in the same period.  
9  Refer to https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/accessing-edgar-data.htm for more EDGAR filing details. Our 
results remain qualitatively unchanged if we include the 1994-1995 data. 
24 
weeks with non-missing return observations for each 12-month estimation period. Accounting data, 
which are mainly used to estimate control, sample partitioning, and channel variables (to be 
explained later), are from COMPUSTAT. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles, and our final sample has 57,062 firm-year observations. Table 1 reports the 
distribution by year, which shows that the observation numbers do not have a dramatic variation 
and an obvious time trend, suggesting a roughly balanced panel data structure.  
In Table 2, we report full-sample statistical summary of the main testing variables in the 
baseline model. The crash risk dependent variables CRASH, NCSKEW, and DUVOL have mean 
values of 0.170, 0.031, and -0.046, respectively, which are quite close to those reported in existing 
U.S.-focused crash risk studies with similar sample period, such as Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2019). 
The mean CRASH indicates that 17% sample firms experience at least one crash event during the 
sample period, reflecting an unconditional crash likelihood. All the crash risk measures have 
standard deviations substantially larger than their corresponding means, suggesting a large 
variation in crash risk levels that facilitates empirical inference. The key independent variable 
RegIndex has an average value of 2.230, a standard deviation of 1.374, and an interquartile range 
of 2.       
4.2. Main results 
4.2.1. Baseline result 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the estimation result for the baseline model in Eq. (4) using 
CRASH as the dependent variable. Following Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2018), 
we employ a linear probability model for the estimation to avoid potential biases from nonlinear 
models with fixed effects (Greene 2004).10 The key independent variable, RegIndex, has a positive 
 
10 Our results are robust to using a nonlinear model such as the Logit regression method. 
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coefficient of 0.006 that is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value = 2.14). This evidence 
suggests that when competition among banks becomes more intensified, as reflected in the removal 
of entry barriers for out-of-state rivals (i.e., a reduction of the value of RegIndex), the likelihood 
of the incidence of borrowers’ sharp stock crash tends to be significantly lower. For one standard 
deviation (1.374 in Table 2) decrease in the number of interstate branching restrictions, the 
likelihood of the occurrence of stock return plunges is reduced by 0.006×1.374 = 0.82%, which is 
4.85% of the average level of unconditional crash likelihood (0.170 in Table 2); If RegIndex is 
reduced from the maximum possible value of four to the minimum possible value of zero, then the 
probability of crash exhibits a substantial drop of 0.006×4 = 2.40%. This implies that, 
economically, firms in states that are completely open to interstate branching have the average 
probability of stock price crash 2.40% lower than those in states with the most restrictions on 
interstate branching, representing a 14% decrease over the unconditional likelihood level. 
Therefore, the influence of bank competition on stock crash risk is not only statistically but also 
economically significant. 
Column 2 reports the estimation result with the continuous variable NCSKEW as the 
dependent variable. The key coefficient on RegIndex, i.e., γ1 in Eq. (4), is positive and statistically 
significant (t-value = 2.33). Its value of 0.017 suggests that the high-moment crash risk measure 
NCSKEW is 0.068 lower in firms headquartered in states without interstate branching barriers 
(RegIndex = 0) than in firms located in states with the most restrictive regulations for out-of-state 
bank entry (RegIndex = 4). For one standard deviation decrease in RegIndex, the drop in NCSKEW 
is 0.023 (= 0.017×1.374). As a comparison, one standard deviation change in MB, one of the 
strongest crash determinants documented in prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2001), causes a 
26 
NCSKEW change of 0.012 (= 0.003×4.216). This perspective suggests that bank competition also 
has economically meaningful impact on the negative coefficient of skewness.  
Result regarding the other crash risk measure that is also related to skewed return 
distribution, DUVOL, as reported in column 3 of Table 3, reveals a similar pattern. The bank 
competition measure RegIndex has a positive coefficient of 0.007 with a t-value of 2.26, pointing 
to a less branching restriction-lower crash risk relation. Like NCSKEW, one standard deviation 
decrease in RegIndex leads to a 0.010 (= 0.007×1.374) drop of in DUVOL, which is larger in 
magnitude than the impact on the same measure from one standard deviation decrease in MB 
(0.001×4.216 = 0.004). Together with the evidence from columns 1 and 2, results in Table 3 deliver 
a clear message that bank branching deregulation, which tends to foster bank competition, induces 
a large decrease in the stock crash risk among borrowing firms. 
Results about the control variables further clarify that the bank competition effect on crash 
risk is in addition to other traditionally accepted crash risk determinants from both firm 
fundamental and trading characteristics. Consistent with prior findings in numerous studies, we 
find that larger (bigger SIZE), growth (larger MB) firms with higher leverage (LEV) tend to be 
associated with higher degrees of stock crash risk, because the coefficients on SIZE, MB, and LEV 
are significantly positive in one or more model specifications with CRASH, NCSKEW, and 
DUVOL as the dependent variables. Firm profitability helps reduce crash risk, as shown by the 
significantly negative coefficients on ROA in all three columns. SD_RET appears to drive down 
stock crash likelihood measured by CRASH; Its negative coefficient implies that if a stock has 
maintained a lower level of volatility in the previous year, it is more likely to crash in the coming 
year. The firm fixed effects and year fixed effects further capture unobserved firm traits and time 
trend. With all these effects controlled, our main variable of interest, RegIndex, still shows 
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significant relations with all of our crash risk measures, highlighting the unique role played by 
banks in influencing stock crashes, as least in the context of bank branching deregulation.  
4.2.2. Robustness 
We conduct a couple of robustness checks for our baseline results. We ensure that the 
impact of RegIndex on crash risk is indeed caused by the deregulation reforms, in two ways. Frist, 
we adopt a multi-period dynamic approach that is similar to Kerr and Nanda (2009) and Amore et 
al. (2013) to examine whether there is any pre-exiting trend in crash risk prior to the changes of 
the interstate branching laws, in the following model: 
    ℎ      ,  =    +      2 +      1 +       0 +       1 +   Post2++          
                             +                   +                    +                                (5). 
To design the model, we restrict our sample to a seven-year window surrounding state 
deregulation years, i.e., three years before and three years after. We denote the reregulation year 
by an indicator variable Year0.11 In the pre-deregulation era, we consider one year before the 
deregulation event as indicated by Pre1, two years before the event Pre2, and three years before 
the event Pre3. In a similar manner, in the post-reregulation era, we separate out one year Post1 
and two years and more Post2+ post-deregulation. Pre3 does not show up in the above equation 
because we treat it as the reference year. With firm and year fixed effects (as well as all other firm 
and trading characteristic variables, denoted collectively by CONTROLS, in the baseline model) 
controlled, this approach is a rather standard difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis in which we 
compare the crash risk levels of firms in a deregulated state with those in other states. We refine 
this DiD model by incorporating more detailed dynamic timing indicators in such a way that, 
although without the involvement of RegIndex, we are able to tell whether any DiD effect exists 
 
11 By referring to deregulation, we exclude the law change events, if any, in which more barriers to interstate branching 
are added.   
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before the passage of the deregulation laws, or whether the changes in crash risk only occur in the 
post-deregulation period. In this sense, we can think of Eq. (5) as an alternative framework for the 
examination on the causal relation between bank competition and crash risk. Specifically, in Eq. 
(5), if Pre1 and Pre2 do not have any significant coefficients, and the significant coefficients are 
associated with Year0, Post1, or Post2+, then it would suggest that it is the deregulation events 
that drive the changes in crash risk. The DiD nature of this approach washes out any potential 
parallel time trends in both treatment group (i.e., firms in the deregulating state) and control group 
(i.e., firms in other states), and secures balanced examination window around the deregulation 
event, thus serving as an ideal design for robustness check.  
In the first three columns of Table 4, we report the results of the above multi-period 
dynamic test. The three models with different crash risk measures as the dependent variable share 
similar patterns around the actual deregulation year: The coefficients on the two pre-period 
indicator variables, Pre2 and Pre1, are small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that firms’ 
crash risk shows no significant change prior to the adoption of the deregulation laws. By contrast, 
the three post-period variables Year0, Post1, and Post2+ have negative and generally significant 
coefficients. They have much larger magnitudes than those in the pre-deregulation period, and 
exhibit a general decreasing trend (i.e., become more negative) as we move forward from the 
reform year, especially in the NCSKEW and DUVOL cases. This evidence suggests that crash risk 
levels become lower after banking deregulation for firms in the deregulating state, relative to the 
concurrent crash risk change for firms in states without deregulation events. This DiD result thus 
clearly confirms that the change in crash risk arises because the states pass the branching 
deregulation legislations, which further mitigates potential endogeneity problem and also implies 
that there is no differing pre-existing trend in crash risk between treatment and control firms prior 
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to interstate branching deregulation. Economically, the result from Eq. (5) is consistent with our 
baseline result from Eq. (4) because both of them show that enhanced bank competition, as 
reflected either in reduced RegIndex or the passage of deregulation laws, brings in lowered level 
of crash risk.  
Although the IBBEA adoption in different states represents regulatory shocks to bank 
competition that are largely exogenous to borrowing firms, which is further secured by the 
accounts of the political economy of the branching deregulation reforms, one potential endogeneity 
concern may still arise that pertains to the possibility of an omitted trend coinciding with the 
deregulation. Such an omitted shock could be the true underlying cause of the change in crash risk, 
but because it is unobservable, its impact is manifested via the (superficial) influence of branching 
deregulation as documented in the baseline regression. In the second way of robustness check, we 
devote additional effort to addressing this issue. We draw on our baseline identification strategy 
that features a staggered adoption process for the banking deregulation policies, and posit that this 
process is unlikely to be accompanied by the fluctuation of an omitted variable at each and every 
deregulation event time (or most of the time). To confirm this conjecture, we conduct a placebo 
test by randomizing the deregulation events in such a way that the actual deregulation trend is 
filtered out but the unobservable shock, if any, is maintained. Specifically, we randomly assign 
states into the deregulation states and non-deregulation ones each year according to the empirical 
distribution of the actual deregulation events across different years. With the distributional pattern 
of regulatory years unchanged from our baseline specification, this approach largely wipes out the 
correct identification of branching regulation changes because we interrupt the proper matching of 
deregulation states and deregulation years. In this situation, the effect from bank branching reforms 
would disappear. Meanwhile, if there is any impact from unobservable shocks from an omitted 
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variable that occur at approximately the same time as the actual deregulation events but are not 
randomized, the impact should still persist and thus drive the result; If no such omitted variable 
exists, then the result should vanish. In short, by observing whether the significant coefficient on 
the IBBEA deregulation index remains in a setting with randomly assigned state-year, we can 
obtain inference about whether our baseline results are subsumed by an omitted variable. 
We re-estimate the baseline regression in Eq. (4) using the randomized deregulation index, 
here we denote by Pseudo RegIndex, and report the results in columns 4-6 of Table 4. We find that 
Pseudo RegIndex ceases to influence crash risk measured either by CRASH, NCSKEW, or DUVOL: 
Its coefficient becomes substantially small (close to zero) and statistically insignificant. The 
evidence clearly suggests that our baseline results are unlikely to be driven by unobservable 
concurrent shocks from an omitted variable, and the disappearance of the effect of the deregulation 
index is mainly due to the disappearance of the proper identification of the deregulation events.  
5. The roles of bank monitoring and funding in the bank competition effect on crash risk  
Our findings so far show that borrowers’ firm-specific stock crash risk is significantly 
reduced in a more competitive environment of lending banks. This is an end-of-pipe effect. Prior 
theoretical and empirical works suggest that crash risk is plausibly driven by managerial piling of 
bad news, and bank competition may influence firm managers via banks’ screening & monitor and 
funding functions embedded in the bank-firm relations. In this section, we seek evidence regarding 
this mechanism.  
We start with the exploration of the general connections between banks and firms. Banks 
need these connections to exert their influence on firms. If firms have heavy dependence on banks 
to conduct their business, or more generally, an economy is significantly reliant on financial 
market, financial service industry, especially banks, should play an important in influencing firm 
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activities, including managerial behaviors. This consideration motivates us to examine firms’ bank 
dependence as the first cross-sectional test. Specifically, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), we assess firms’ degree of dependence on banks by their demand for 
external funds estimated by the gap between total capital expenditures and cash flow from 
operations. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) justify that an instrument for bank dependence 
constructed this way is highly correlated with firms’ actual use of bank and other intermediary 
funds. We then partition our sample firms into high- and low-dependence subgroups according to 
the median value of bank dependence estimates, and re-estimate the baseline model in Eq. (4) in 
each subgroup. Table 5, Panel A shows that in the subsample of firms with high level of bank 
dependence, bank competition induced by branching deregulation engenders a much stronger 
impact on firms’ stock crash risk, measured in any of the three ways, than in firms with low level 
of bank dependence. In fact, among low-dependence firms, the coefficients on RegIndex become 
insignificant and small in all the model specifications involving CRASH, NCSKEW, and DUVOL. 
This evidence reveals that bank competition’s influence on firm crash risk largely depends on how 
influential the bank system is in the product market. It further suggests that in a market with 
relatively less (more) developed financial system, both the firms’ dependence on banks and banks’ 
influence on firms tend to be weaker (stronger), which naturally diminishes (boosts) the shocks to 
the product market from any reforms in the banking system.  
After establishing the link between bank competition and firm crash risk via overall bank 
dependence of firms, we move on to look for more direct evidence on the roles of monitoring and 
funding which are arguably the most commonly accepted determinants of firm-specific stock 
crashes. In Panel B of Table 5, we focus on firm opaqueness to examine the function of bank 
screening & monitoring, because the unique advantage of banks in obtaining private information 
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and supervising debtors’ behaviors tends to be more prominent in a firm that is uneasy to 
understand. If the change in bank competition environment does not work on firm crash risk by 
changing banks’ willingness and ability to screen and monitor borrowers, we would not observe 
the influence of branching deregulation conditioning on the level of borrowers’ opaqueness. In 
fact, we do observe such a conditioning effect. As shown in Panel B, after partitioning the sample 
firms by the median level of opaqueness, measured by absolute discretionary accruals, we find that 
RegIndex’s impacts on the three crash risk measures are significantly larger in the high-opaqueness 
firms than in the low-opaqueness firms: The coefficient magnitude in the former group is more 
than two times of that in the latter group for the measure DUVOL, three times for NCSKEW, and 
ten times for CRASH. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture about bank screening and 
monitoring in the connection between bank competition and firm crash risk. 
In Panel C of Table 5, we delve into the funding function of banks in their influence on 
crash risk by conditioning on firm innovations. The rationale is that, although the literature is 
divergent on the overall liquidity provision function of bank competition, prior studies (e.g., 
Amore et al. 2013; Chava et al. 2013; Cornaggia et al. 2015) have generally reached a consensus 
that bank deregulation is especially beneficial to innovations by making banking funds easier and 
cheaper for firms’ innovative projects. Innovation therefore presents an unambiguous setting for 
examining our bank funding conjecture. Following the traditional approach in prior literature, we 
use research and development (R&D) expenditures (scaled by total assets) to reflect the general 
innovative behaviors in the sample firms, and form subsamples according to the median value. 
The results show that the influences of RegIndex on crash risk measures CRASH, NCSKEW, and 
DUVOL persist and become much stronger in the high-R&D subsample, and disappear in the low-
R&D subsample (where the RegIndex coefficient even turns to negative, although insignificant). 
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The implication is that for firms with more innovative projects, bank competition exhibits a larger 
constraining influence on their stock crash risk. Combined with findings in prior studies that 
intensified bank competition also fosters funding provision to innovative firms, our evidence 
suggests that improved competition in banks affects borrowers’ crash risk through a funding-
related route, and such a route leads to reduced crash likelihood and magnitude.  
To summarize, the many cross-sectional tests in Table 5 send support to the notion that 
bank competition due to branching deregulation appears to cause changes in firm crash risk via 
altering the bank functions to monitor and finance borrowing firms, which in turn affect firm crash 
risk in stock returns. This argument is largely in line with the general logic link between banks, 
corporate governance, and crash risk.  
6. Bank competition and firms’ intense divulgence of extremely adverse news and 
information manipulation  
After documenting evidence for the possible behaviors (i.e., monitoring and funding) of 
banks in the above section, we continue in this section to look into the possible behaviors of firms, 
in particular, the abrupt extremely adverse reporting and information manipulation, both of which 
relate to bad news hiding activities: The former is the outcome due to the accumulation of negative 
news being exceeding the breaking point, while the latter is the channel through which bad news 
is piled up. Banks’ influence on firm crash risk starts from bank behaviors, and logically leads to 
firm behaviors that end up with changes in realized crash risk triggered by the outbreak of large 
pieces of adverse information. In this sense, examining firm behavior completes the logic link: 
The bank monitoring and funding efforts would not change the agency problem-based crash risk 
without changing the actual managerial concealing of inferior news, and the crash risk would not 
realize without the avalanche of hidden information.  
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Guided by this rationale, the first perspective that we take to examine the crash risk-related 
firm behavior issue revolves around the link between bank competition and the actual releasing 
events of extremely inferior information that is unknown to (and thus unexpected by) outsiders. 
Such events are considered to trigger the collapse of stock price in the equity market. To this end, 
we first estimate annual unexpected earnings as a firm’s change in income before extraordinary 
items from the previous year to the current year, scaled by the lagged market value of equity, and 
then identify unexpected extremely adverse news divulgence by the years in which (i) the firm’s 
unexpected earnings are in the bottom decile and (ii) its unexpected earnings in the previous year 
is non-negative. The bottom decile represents the very negative information, while non-negative 
earnings in prior announcements are to ensure the unexpected nature. We define a dummy variable 
SURP_UE for each firm-year if the above two conditions are satisfied. In a similar manner, we 
construct another dummy measure SURP_G using an alternative source of firm information 
releasing: the issuing of managerial earnings guidance. Specifically, we identify negative earnings 
guidance from the announcements that the firm is not expected to meet the prior expectation/target, 
vis-à-vis other scenarios in which the earnings target is met or exceeded (or the target is not 
specified). SURP_G equals one if a firm issues a negative guidance in the current year but not in 
the previous year, and zero otherwise. Briefly, both SURP_UE and SURP_G indicate the incidence 
of intense adverse information divulging, which have been adopted in existing literature to serve 
the same purpose in crash risk studies, e.g., Chang et al. (2017). 
Using these two indicators as the dependent variable in the baseline Eq. (4), we re-estimate 
the model and report the results in Table 6. The coefficients on SURP_UE and SURP_G are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level; They also share similar magnitude of 0.008 
and 0.006, respectively, confirming their economic significance because firms in the most open 
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states are associated with extremely adverse information releasing probability 3.2% lower in 
earnings announcements and 2.4% lower in managerial earnings guidance, relative to those in the 
most restrictive states with regard to interstate branching policies. Therefore, more bank 
competition leads to less releasing of extremely inferior news that can trigger stock price crashes, 
thus bridging the connection from bank competition to crash risk. 
Following with the above analysis, we take the second perspective to see whether bank 
competition helps in constraining the hoarding of bad news in normal times. If so, banks serve to 
dissuade managerial misbehavior and encourage fair disclosures, which leads to less abrupt 
divulgence of accumulated negative message and consequently lower crash risk. In this regard, we 
focus on the disguising of inferior information as reflected in the manipulation of earnings. 
Earnings management is a widely adopted way in financial disclosure through which managers 
use multiple methods to avoid reporting losses, conceal corporate weakness, and withhold other 
defective information that may cause investors’ stock-selling behaviors. Following Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), we identify earning management behaviors with and without 
direct cash flow consequences. The cash flow-unrelated earnings management is generally 
conducted through accruals manipulation; We denoted it by Accrual_EM, and estimate it using the 
cross-sectional Jones (1991) model that captures abnormal accruals. The cash flow-related 
earnings management is termed real earnings management which alters real activities that deviate 
from normal business practices (Roychowdhury 2006); We construct two aggregate metrics 
Real_EM1 and Real_EM2 as by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) from potential behaviors that 
accelerate the timing of sales, report lower cost of goods sold through increased production, and 
decrease discretionary expenses (the Appendix provides the details).  
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Using these earning management measures as the dependent variable, we estimate the 
following model which retains the key IBBEA deregulation index RegIndex and adopts control 
variables identified in prior literature (e.g., Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011) that may 
also affect earnings management: 
                    ,  =    +            ,  +        ,  +       ,  +      4 ,   
                                                    +     ,  +       ,    +      ,  +       ,  +      ,   
                                                      +                   +                    +             (6). 
In Eq. (6), Earnings Management refers to Accrual_EM, Real_EM1, or Real_EM2. The 
control variables BIG4, NOA, IO, and CR refer to, respectively, the indicator for external editor as 
Big 4 or 5 audit firms, net operating assets, institutional ownership, and current asset ratio. The 
appendix contains their definition details. Other controls variables are identical to those in the 
baseline model. The estimation results, as shown in the first three columns of Table 7, suggest a 
decreased degree of earning management in borrowing firms as the competition among lending 
banks becomes harsher: The coefficient on RegIndex is statistically positive in all model 
specifications with different earnings management dependent variables, i.e., reduction in RegIndex 
and increase in bank competition degree bring about lower levels of manipulations on either 
accrued earnings and real earnings behaviors. The evidence suggests that competition in banks 
makes firms more actively adopt bad news releasing activities. The diminished earning 
management helps in a better reflection of firm operations in financial disclosures and thus reduces 
potential bad news hoarding and crash risk. 
To have a more comprehensive understanding of information hiding in accounting 
disclosure, we further examine financial reporting quality, captured by restatement of accounting 
reports. The idea behind this measurement is that restatement is often triggered by inaccurate 
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materials in previous financial statements which are plausibly related to managers’ intentional 
concealing of negative information. More directly relevant to our study, a negative restatement 
often shakes the confidence from investors and causes stock price to decline or even collapse. We 
replace the earnings management dependent variable in Eq. (6) by a restatement dummy variable 
Restatement which indicates the actual occurrence of restatement events in a given year, and re-
estimate the model. Result reported in the last column of Table 7 shows that RegIndex has a 
positive coefficient of 0.008 which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value = 1.99), 
suggesting a smaller likelihood of accounting restatement among firms in more bank-competitive 
states, which reflects improved quality in accounting disclosure and better revealing of negative 
information. This logically leads to a smaller degree of potential stock crash risk. Overall, findings 
in Table 7 send consistent message that bank competition fosters improved accounting disclosures 
that help constrain crash risk. 
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we inquire into the possible influences of banks on borrowing firms’ stock 
crash risk. Our inquiry is motivated by banks’ unique role in addressing firms’ agency problem, 
mainly through their monitoring and funding functions, in which managerial opportunistic 
behaviors to conceal unfavorable information may cause the stockpile of bad news and eventually 
end up in severe stock price crashes. Although the literature on the determinants of crash risk is 
remarkably vast, the influence from banks is largely neglected. We supplement this literature by 
examining whether and how banks affect firm crash risk in the context of the interstate branching 
deregulation process triggered by the IBBEA in the U.S. This institutional setting helps mitigate 
potential endogeneity problem embedded in the association between banks and firm crash risk, 
because interstate branching deregulation represents, arguably, the most important U.S. banking 
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reform in the past century that is nevertheless largely exogenous to firms’ product market. The 
deregulation removes restrictions on out-of-state entry of rivals, and fosters bank competition, 
which in turn fundamentally changes both the monitoring and funding functions of banks. We 
therefore focus our exploration on the impact of bank competition on crash risk, zooming in on 
the change of crash risk along the gradual branching restriction relaxing process in different states. 
We document three sets of results that depict a logic link from bank competition to stock 
crash risk. First, as the baseline result, bank competition reduces firms’ crash risk, because firms 
headquartered in states whose banking markets are more open to out-of-state entry have 
significantly lower level of price crash risk, as reflected in stock return distributions, than firms in 
states with more restrictive interstate branching policies; Second, the crash risk-reducing effect of 
bank competition is more prominent among firms with higher degrees of bank dependence, 
informational opaqueness, and innovations. Because banks, through their businesses with 
borrowers, tend to have stronger monitoring function in more opaque firms, and also stronger 
funding effect in more innovative firms that have been shown to benefit more from bank 
competition, this evidence is consistent with the conjecture about bank monitoring and funding in 
banks’ influence on borrowers; Third, bank competition reduces incidence of intense adverse 
information divulgence and mitigates earnings management behaviors in borrowing firms, and 
improves their reporting quality, all of which could directly lead to less hoarding of inferior news 
and also less degree of crash risk. Collectively, these results consistently suggest that there exist 
significant and robust impacts of banks on borrowers’ stock crash risk. 
Our study, in a broad background, provides insights to the nexus between financial 
development and economic development. Banking deregulation and bank competition not only 
help stabilize the financial market, i.e., the risk of banks themselves, as shown in previous studies, 
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but also contribute to the stabilization of the economic market, i.e., the firms as borrowers, as 
suggested by our findings. Moreover, we connect competitive shocks to banks with borrowers’ 
information manipulation, which also enriches the way through which banks could affect firm 
risks, and thus suggest an outlet to examining bank competition, accounting information, and stock 
market performance.         
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Bank Competition Measure 
RegIndex This variable refers to the IBBEA deregulation index for U.S. states and the D.C. developed by 
Rice and Strahan (2010), representing the number of interstate branching barriers among (i) 
requiring a minimum age of at least three years on target institutions, (ii) forbidding de novo 
interstate branching, (iii) applying a deposit cap less than 30%, and (iv) prohibiting individual 
branch acquisitions. The index is set to zero for states that are most open to out-of-state entry, i.e., 
without any barriers. The index increases by one when a state adds any of the four barriers just 
described, and ranges from zero to four. Lower RegIndex reflects higher degree of bank 
competition. Source: Rice and Strahan (2010). 
Crash Risk Measures 
CRASH An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s stock experiences one or more crash weeks during 
a given year, and zero otherwise. A crash week is a week in which the firm-specific weekly stock 
return falls 3.2 standard deviations below its mean value for the year. Firm-specific weekly return 
for each firm in each year is the natural logarithm of one plus the residual from the regression in 
Eq. (1) in the text. Source: CRSP, COMPUSTAT. 
NCSKEW Negative conditional skewness of the firm-specific weekly returns (as described above) over a 
year, estimated by the third moment of the distribution of firm-specific returns scaled by its 
standard deviation raised to the third power, and then multiplied by -1, as in Eq. (2) in the text. 
Source: CRSP, COMPUSTAT. 
DUVOL Down-to-up volatilities estimated as the logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation on the 
down weeks to the standard deviation on the up weeks, as shown in Eq. (3) in the text. Down 
weeks refer to those with firm-specific returns (as described above) below the mean of the year, 
and up weeks have firm-specific returns above the annual mean. Source: CRSP, COMPUSTAT. 
Baseline Control Variables 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
LEV Total long-term debt scaled by total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
MB Ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
DTRUN The current year average monthly share turnover minus the previous year average monthly share 
turnover, where monthly share turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding during the month. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
SD_RET The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the year. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
MEAN_RET The mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the year, multiplied by 100. Source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
Sample Partitioning Variables in the Tests of Bank Monitoring and Funding Roles 
Bank Dependence A measure for firms’ dependence on banks from Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2006), estimated as total capital expenditure minus operating cash flow, scaled by total 
assets, which has been shown to be highly correlated with firms’ actual use of bank and other 
intermediary funds. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Firm Opaqueness Absolute discretionary accruals estimated using a cross-sectional modified-Jones model. Source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
Firm Innovation R&D expenses scaled by total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Variables in the Tests of Intense Adverse Information Divulging, Earnings Manipulation, and Reporting Quality 
SURP_UE An indicator variable that equals one if the unexpected earnings of the firm are in the bottom 
decile in the current year and its unexpected earnings are non-negative in the previous year, and 
zero otherwise. Unexpected earnings refer to Earnings Per Share (Basic) Excluding Extraordinary 
Items in the current year minus that in the previous year. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
SURP_G An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is expected to miss the latest management 
earnings forecast in current year but not in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
Accrual_EM Abnormal accruals estimated using a cross-sectional modified-Jones model. Source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
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Real_EM1 An measure of real earnings management calculated by multiplying abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by negative one and then aggregating them. 
Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Real_EM2 An measure of real earnings management calculated by multiplying abnormal discretionary 
expenses and negative one and adding it to abnormal production costs. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Restatement An indicator variable that equals one for a firm-year with restatement, and zero otherwise. Source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
BIG4 
An indicator variable that equals one if a Big 5 or 4 audit firm is the external auditor for a firm-
year, and zero otherwise. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
NOA 
Net operating assets, calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable 
securities plus total debt, scaled by total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
IO Institutional ownership. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
CR Current assets scaled by total assets. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
References 
Akins, B., L. Li, J. Ng, and T. Rusticus. 2016. Bank competition and financial stability: Evidence 
from the financial crisis. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51, 1-28. 
Allen, F. 1990. The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 1, 3-30. 
Allen, F., and D. Gale. 2000. Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Amore, M.D., C. Schneider, and A. Zaldokas. 2013. Credit supply and corporate innovation. 
Journal of Financial Economics 109, 835-855. 
An, H., and T. Zhang. 2013. Stock price synchronicity, crash risk, and institutional investors. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 21, 1-15. 
Bai, J., D. Carvalho, and G.M. Phillips. 2018. The impact of bank credit on labor reallocation and 
aggregate industry productivity. Journal of Finance 73, 2787-2836. 
Bao, D., S. Fung, and L. Su. 2018. Can shareholders be at rest after adopting clawback provisions? 
Evidence from stock price crash risk. Contemporary Accounting Research 35, 1578-1615. 
Bates, D.S. 1991. The crash of ’87: Was it expected: Evidence from options markets. Journal of 
Finance 46, 1009-1044. 
Bates, D.S. 2000. Post-’87 crash fears in the S&P 500 futures option market. Journal of 
Econometrics 94, 181-238. 
Berger, A., N. Miller, M. Petersen, R. Rajan, and J. Stein. 2005. Does function follow 
organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks. Journal 
of Financial Economics 76, 237-269. 
Bharath, S., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders, and A. Srinivasan. 2011. Lending relationships and loan 
contract terms. Review of Financial Studies 24, 1141-1203. 
Bharath, S., J. Sunder, and S.V. Sunder. 2008. Accounting quality and debt contracting. The 
Accounting Review 83, 1-28. 
Black, S.E., and P.E. Strahan. 2002. Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability. Journal of 
Finance 57, 2807-2833. 
Bleck, A., and X. Liu. 2007. Market transparency and the accounting regime. Journal of 
Accounting Research 45, 229-256. 
Brickley, J., J. Linck, and C. Smith Jr. 2003. Boundaries of the firm Evidence from the banking 
industry. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 351-383. 
Boyd, J.H., and G. De Nicolo. 2005. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. 
Journal of Finance 60, 1329-1343. 
Burks, J.J., C. Cuny, J. Gerakos, and J. Granja. 2018. Competition and voluntary disclosure: 
Evidence from deregulation in the banking industry. Review of Accounting Studies 23, 1471-
1511. 
43 
Bushman, R.M., B.E. Hendricks, and C.D. Williams. 2016. Bank competition: Measurement, 
decision-making, and risk-taking. Journal of Accounting Research 54, 777-826. 
Bushman, R.M., Q. Wang, and C.D. Williams. 2017. Governance, competition and opportunistic 
accounting choices by banks. Working paper, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 
National University of Singapore, and University of Michigan. 
Callen, J., and X. Fang. 2013. Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus 
short-termism? Journal of Banking and Finance 37, 3047-3063. 
Callen, J., and X. Fang. 2015. Short interest and stock price crash risk. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 60, 181-194. 
Callen, J., and X. Fang. 2017. Crash risk and the auditor-client relationship. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 34, 1715-1750. 
Cetorelli, N., and P.E. Strahan. 2006. Finance as a barrier to entry: Bank competition and industry 
structure in local U.S. markets. Journal of Finance 61, 437-461. 
Chang, X., Y. Chen, and L. Zolotoy. 2017. Stock liquidity and stock price crash risk. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52, 1605-1637. 
Chava, S., A. Oettl, A. Subramanian, and K.V. Subramanian. 2013. Banking deregulation and 
innovation. Journal of Financial Economics 109, 759-774. 
Chen, J., H. Hong, and J.C. Stein. 2001. Forecasting crashes: Trading volume, past returns, and 
conditional skewness in stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics 61, 345-381. 
Chen, Q., and R. Vashishtha. 2017. The effects of bank mergers on corporate information 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 64, 56-77. 
Cohen, D.A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around 
seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 2-19. 
Cornaggia, J., Y. Mao, X. Tian, and B. Wolfe. 2015. Does banking competition affect innovation? 
Journal of Financial Economics 115, 189-209. 
Dass, N., and M. Massa. 2011. The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the borrowing 
firm. Review of Financial Studies 24, 1204-1260. 
Demsetz, R.S., M.R. Saidenberg, and P.E. Strahan. 1996. Banks with something to lose: The 
disciplinary role of franchise value. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review 2, 1-14. 
Demyanyk, Y., C. Ostergaard, and B.E. Sorensen. 2007. U.S. banking deregulation, small business, 
and interstate insurance of personal income. Journal of Finance 62, 2763-2801. 
Denis, D.J., and V.T. Mihov. 2003. The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public 
debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 3-28. 
Diamond, D. 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic 
Studies 51, 393-414. 
44 
Diamond, D., and P.H. Dybvig 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. Journal of 
Political Economy 91, 401-419. 
Dick, A. 2006. Nationwide branching and its impact on market structure, quality, and bank 
performance. Journal of Business 79, 567-592. 
Dou, Y., R. Stephen, and Y. Zou. 2018. The effect of credit competition on banks’ loan-loss 
provisions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, 1195-1226. 
Fama, E. 1985. What’s different about banks? Journal of Monetary Economics 15, 29-39. 
Favara, G., and J. Imbs. 2015. Credit supply and the price of housing. American Economic Review 
105, 958-992. 
Gan, J. 2004. Banking market structure and financial stability: Evidence from the Texas Real 
Estate Crisis in the 1980s. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 567-701. 
Greene, W. 2004. The behavior of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable 
models in the presence of fixed effects. Econometrics Journal 7, 98-119. 
Goetz, M.R., L. Laeven, and R. Levine. 2016. Does the geographic expansion of banks reduce risk? 
Journal of Financial Economics 120, 346-362. 
Habib, A., M.M. Hasan, and H. Jiang. 2018. Stock price crash risk: Review of the empirical 
literature. Accounting and Finance 58, 211-251. 
Hauswald, R., and R. Marquez. 2006. Competition and strategic information acquisition in credit 
markets. Review of Financial Studies 19, 967-1000. 
Hellmann, T., K. Murdock, and J. Stiglitz. 2000. Liberalization, moral hazard in banking, and 
prudential regulation: Are capital requirements enough? American Economic Review 90, 147-
165. 
Hong, H., and J.C. Stein. 2003. Differences in opinion, short-sales constraints, and market crashes. 
Review of Financial Studies 16, 487-525. 
Hutton, A., A. Marcus, and H. Tehranian. 2009. Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk. 
Journal of Financial Economics 94, 67-86. 
Jayaratne, J., and P.E. Strahan. 1996. The finance-growth nexus: Evidence from bank branch 
deregulation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639-670. 
Jayaratne, J., and P.E. Strahan. 1998. Entry restrictions, industry evolution, and dynamic efficiency: 
Evidence from commercial banking. Journal of Law and Economics 41, 239-274. 
Jiang, L., R. Levine, and C. Lin. 2016. Competition and bank opacity. Review of Financial Studies 
29, 1911-1942. 
Jiang, L., R. Levine, and C. Lin. 2019. Competition and bank liquidity creation. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, 513-538. 
Jin, L., and S.C. Myers. 2006. R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of Financial 
Economics 79, 257-292. 
45 
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting 
Research 29, 193-228. 
Kashyap, A., R. Rajan, and J. Stein. 2002. Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation for the co-
existence of lending and deposit-taking. Journal of Finance 57, 33-74. 
Keeley, M. 1990. Deposit insurance, risk and market power in banking. American Economic 
Review 80, 1183-1200. 
Kerr, W.R., and R. Nanda. 2009. Democratizing entry: Bank deregulation, financing constraints, 
and entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics 94, 124-149. 
Kim, C., K. Wang, and L. Zhang. 2019. Readability of 10-K reports and stock price crash risk. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming. 
Kim, J., P. Shroff, D. Vyas, and R. Wittenberg-Moerman. 2018. Credit default swaps and managers’ 
voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 56, 953-988. 
Kim, J.-B., X. Li, Y. Luo, and K. Wang. 2019. Foreign investors, external monitoring, and stock 
price crash risk. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Forthcoming. 
Kim, J.-B., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. 2011a. Corporate tax avoidance and stock crash risk: Firm-level 
analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 639-662. 
Kim, J.-B., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. 2011b. CEOs versus CFOs: Equity incentives and crashes. Journal 
of Financial Economics 101, 713-730. 
Kim, J.-B., Y. Lu, and Y. Yu. 2019. Analyst coverage and expected crash risk: Evidence from 
exogenous changes in analyst coverage. The Accounting Review, Forthcoming. 
Kim, J.-B., Z. Wang, and L. Zhang. 2016. CEO overconfidence and stock price crash risk. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 33, 1720-1749. 
Kothari, S.P., S. Shu, and P.D. Wysocki. 2009. Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of 
Accounting Research 47, 241-276. 
Kroszner, R.S., and P.E. Strahan. 1999. What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the 
relaxation of bank branching restrictions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1437-1467. 
Kubick, T.R., and G.B. Lockhart. 2016. Proximity to the SEC and stock price crash risk. Financial 
Management 45, 341-367. 
Lawrence, A., M. Minutti-Meza, and P. Zhang. 2011. Can Big 4 versus non-Big 4 differences in 
audit-quality proxies be attributed to client characteristics? The Accounting Review 86, 259-
286. 
Leuz, C., and P.D. Wysocki. 2016. The economics of disclosure and financial reporting regulation: 
Evidence and suggestions for future research. Journal of Accounting Research 54, 525-622. 
Li, S., and X. Zhan. 2019. Product market threats and stock crash risk. Management Science, 
Forthcoming. 
Liu, J., J. Ng, D. Tang, and R. Zhong. 2018. CDS trading and stock price crash risk. Working paper, 
46 
University of International Business and Economics, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 
University of Hong Kong, and Central University of Finance and Economics. 
Luo, J.H., M. Gong, Y. Lin, and Q. Fang. 2016. Political connections and stock price crash risk: 
Evidence from China. Economic Letters 147, 90-92. 
Peterson, M.A., and R.G. Rajan. 1995. The effect of credit market competition on lending 
relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-443. 
Peterson, M.A., and R.G. Rajan. 2002. Does distance still matter? The information revolution in 
small business lending. Journal of Finance 57, 2533-2570. 
Rajan, R.G. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. 
Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. 
Rajan, R.G., and L. Zingales. 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 
88, 559-587. 
Ramakrishnan, R., and A.V. Thakor. 1984. Information reliability and a theory of financial 
intermediation. Review of Economic Studies 51, 415-432. 
Repullo, R. 2004. Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 13, 156-182. 
Rice, T., and P. Strahan. 2010. Does credit competition affect small-firm finance? Journal of 
Finance 65, 861-889. 
Roychowdhury, S. 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 42, 335-370. 
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 
737-783. 
Tomy, R.E. 2019. Threat of entry and the use of discretion in banks’ financial reporting. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 67, 1-35. 
Winton, A. 1995. Delegated monitoring and bank structure in a finite economy. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 4, 158-187. 
Winton, A. 1999. Don’t put all your eggs in one basket? Diversification and specialization in 
lending. Working paper, University of Minnesota. 
Zang, A.Y. 2012. Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
earnings management. The Accounting Review 87, 675-703. 
Zarutskie, R. 2006. Evidence on the effects of bank competition on firm borrowing and investment. 
Journal of Financial Economics 81, 503-537. 
Zhang, Y., Y. Guan, and J.-B. Kim. 2019. XBRL adoption and expected crash risk. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 38, 31-52. 
 
 
47 
Table 1. Sample distribution by year 
The sample includes U.S. non-financial public companies during 1996-2016 that are headquartered in the 50 
states and the D.C. There are totally 57,062 firm-year observations. This table reports sample distribution by 
year.  
Year Freq. Pct. Cum. 
1996 2,279 3.99 3.99 
1997 3,699 6.48 10.48 
1998 3,829 6.71 17.19 
1999 3,748 6.57 23.75 
2000 3,274 5.74 29.49 
2001 3,121 5.47 34.96 
2002 2,989 5.24 40.20 
2003 3,039 5.33 45.53 
2004 2,931 5.14 50.66 
2005 2,730 4.78 55.45 
2006 2,585 4.53 59.98 
2007 2,560 4.49 64.46 
2008 2,338 4.10 68.56 
2009 2,450 4.29 72.85 
2010 2,343 4.11 76.96 
2011 2,220 3.89 80.85 
2012 2,176 3.81 84.66 
2013 2,146 3.76 88.42 
2014 2,197 3.85 92.28 
2015 2,183 3.83 96.10 
2016 2,225 3.90 100 
Total 57,062 100  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of main testing variables 
This table reports summary statistics of variables in the baseline model. The statistics are computed from all 
firm-years in the full sample. Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
CRASH 57,062 0.170  0.375  0.000  0.000  0.000  
NCSKEW 57,062 0.031  0.850  -0.448  -0.004  0.452  
DUVOL 57,062 -0.046  0.379  -0.300  -0.056  0.192  
RegIndex 57,062 2.230  1.374  1.000  3.000  3.000  
ROA 57,062 -0.021  0.206  -0.025  0.033  0.073  
SIZE 57,062 5.923  2.074  4.402  5.888  7.330  
LEV 57,062 0.180  0.194  0.002  0.130  0.294  
MB 57,062 3.004  4.216  1.226  2.027  3.530  
DTURN 57,062 0.022  0.954  -0.266  0.004  0.281  
SD_RET 57,062 0.062  0.034  0.036  0.053  0.079  
MEAN_RET 57,062 -0.245  0.294  -0.303  -0.140  -0.064  
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Table 3. Baseline results 
This table reports estimation results for the baseline model of Eq. (4). The dependent variables CRASH, 
NCSKEW, and DUVOL are proxies for stock price crash risk. The key independent variable is the IBBEA 
deregulation index RegIndex whose lower values indicate higher levels of bank competition. Firm and trading 
characteristic variables are controlled as in Eq. (4). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. The regression coefficients on independent variables are reported, followed by the robust t-statistics 
(in the parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients on the 
firm and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
RegIndext 0.006** 0.017** 0.007** 
 (2.14) (2.33) (2.26) 
ROAt -0.099*** -0.312*** -0.124*** 
 (-7.70) (-10.59) (-9.55) 
SIZEt-1 0.055*** 0.223*** 0.107*** 
 (19.34) (33.50) (36.28) 
LEVt-1 0.033** 0.058 0.017 
 (2.07) (1.50) (0.99) 
MBt-1 0.000 0.003*** 0.001** 
 (0.76) (2.84) (2.42) 
DTURNt-1 0.007*** 0.010** 0.005** 
 (3.60) (2.32) (2.49) 
SD_RETt-1 -0.698*** 0.267 -0.118 
 (-2.96) (0.49) (-0.49) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.009 0.062 0.023 
 (-0.39) (1.13) (0.95) 
Intercept -0.161*** -1.339*** -0.695*** 
 (-7.16) (-25.09) (-29.39) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 57,062 57,062 57,062 
R-Squared 0.020 0.044 0.053 
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Table 4. Robustness tests for the baseline model 
The dependent variables CRASH, NCSKEW, and DUVOL are proxies for stock price crash risk. In columns 1-3, 
the key independent variables are the indicators for the seven years surrounding a state’s adoption event of the 
IBBEA. Year0 indicates the event year, Pre1 and Pre2 indicate one and two years before the deregulation, 
respectively, and Post1 and Post2+ indicate one and two or more years after the deregulation, respectively. In 
columns 4-6, the key independent variable Pseudo RegIndex refers to the randomized deregulation index. Firm 
and trading characteristic variables are controlled as in Eq. (4). Details about the variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. The regression coefficients on independent variables are reported, followed by the robust t-
statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the 
coefficients on the firm and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Dynamic DiD Test Random Effect Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
Pre2 -0.017 -0.028 0.004    
 (-0.79) (-0.61) (0.20)    
Pre1 -0.023 -0.055 -0.017    
 (-1.19) (-1.34) (-0.90)    
Year0 -0.039** -0.091** -0.020      
 (-1.96) (-2.07) (-1.02)      
Post1 -0.030 -0.105** -0.030    
 (-1.43) (-2.25) (-1.43)    
Post2+ -0.033 -0.160*** -0.051**    
 (-1.41) (-2.99) (-2.17)    
Pseudo RegIndext    -0.000 0.001 0.001 
    (-0.35) (0.40) (0.60) 
ROAt -0.080*** -0.180*** -0.081*** -0.099*** -0.311*** -0.124*** 
 (-3.04) (-3.06) (-3.04) (-7.67) (-10.57) (-9.53) 
SIZEt-1 0.072*** 0.294*** 0.146*** 0.054*** 0.223*** 0.107*** 
 (9.82) (17.88) (20.12) (19.25) (33.36) (36.15) 
LEVt-1 -0.004 -0.036 -0.021 0.028* 0.053 0.017 
 (-0.11) (-0.43) (-0.58) (1.89) (1.54) (1.16) 
MBt-1 0.001 0.0030 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.001** 
 (1.16) (1.25) (0.39) (0.77) (2.88) (2.44) 
DTURNt-1 0.011*** 0.023** 0.009** 0.007*** 0.010** 0.005** 
 (2.79) (2.47) (2.09) (3.60) (2.37) (2.50) 
SD_RETt-1 -1.553*** -1.501** -0.586* -0.906*** -0.334 -0.415*** 
 (-5.30) (-2.04) (-1.80) (-6.40) (-1.18) (-3.24) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.045*** -0.0540 -0.026 -0.032*** -0.001 -0.010 
 (-2.76) (-1.10) (-1.19) (-3.38) (-0.06) (-1.40) 
Intercept -0.148*** -1.473*** -0.826*** -0.130*** -1.262*** -0.662*** 
 (-3.17) (-14.04) (-17.47) (-6.70) (-27.68) (-32.50) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 15,019 15,019 15,019 57,062 57,062 57,062 
R-Squared 0.027 0.061 0.070 0.020 0.044 0.053 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
Table 5. The roles of bank monitoring and funding   
The baseline model of Eq. (4) is estimated in subsamples partitioned according to the levels of firms’ bank 
dependence (in Panel A), firm opaqueness (in Panel B), and firm innovation (in Panel C). The dependent 
variables CRASH, NCSKEW, and DUVOL are proxies for stock price crash risk. The key independent variable 
is the IBBEA deregulation index RegIndex. Firm and trading characteristic variables are controlled as in Eq. (4). 
Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The regression coefficients on independent 
variables are reported, followed by the robust t-statistics (in the parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients on the firm and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Bank dependence 
 Low Bank Dependence High Bank Dependence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
RegIndext 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.009** 0.036*** 0.016*** 
 (0.95) (0.16) (0.14) (2.15) (3.48) (3.48) 
ROAt -0.168*** -0.483*** -0.203*** -0.083*** -0.243*** -0.094*** 
 (-4.99) (-6.31) (-6.08) (-5.35) (-6.84) (-6.00) 
SIZEt-1 0.065*** 0.239*** 0.116*** 0.052*** 0.228*** 0.109*** 
 (14.08) (23.70) (25.97) (13.30) (23.94) (25.83) 
LEVt-1 0.018 0.071 0.023 0.047** 0.061 0.015 
 (0.70) (1.17) (0.88) (2.07) (1.11) (0.64) 
MBt-1 0.001 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (1.33) (3.13) (2.91) (0.05) (1.17) (0.83) 
DTURNt-1 0.007** 0.011* 0.004 0.008*** 0.008 0.004* 
 (2.15) (1.65) (1.51) (3.24) (1.40) (1.69) 
SD_RETt-1 -0.951** 0.492 0.179 -0.912*** -1.596** -1.040*** 
 (-2.44) (0.56) (0.47) (-2.72) (-2.02) (-3.02) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.051 0.032 0.033 -0.012 -0.077 -0.054 
 (-1.22) (0.33) (0.79) (-0.39) (-1.03) (-1.63) 
Intercept -0.202*** -1.426*** -0.755*** -0.148*** -1.318*** -0.678*** 
 (-5.56) (-17.86) (-21.12) (-4.77) (-17.48) (-20.24) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 27,879 27,879 27,879 29,183 29,183 29,183 
R-Squared 0.022 0.040 0.048 0.022 0.054 0.065 
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Panel B: Firm opaqueness 
 Low Firm Opaqueness High Firm Opaqueness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
RegIndext 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.010** 0.027** 0.011** 
 (0.22) (0.88) (1.01) (2.16) (2.44) (2.19) 
ROAt -0.182*** -0.536*** -0.220*** -0.085*** -0.265*** -0.100*** 
 (-5.68) (-7.15) (-6.74) (-5.51) (-7.56) (-6.48) 
SIZEt-1 0.052*** 0.217*** 0.106*** 0.059*** 0.231*** 0.109*** 
 (11.48) (21.04) (23.63) (15.35) (25.04) (26.85) 
LEVt-1 0.051** 0.074 0.028 0.015 0.014 -0.008 
 (1.96) (1.25) (1.09) (0.66) (0.26) (-0.34) 
MBt-1 0.001 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (1.51) (3.65) (3.58) (-0.53) (0.79) (0.26) 
DTURNt-1 0.010*** 0.014** 0.006** 0.004 0.005 0.003 
 (3.19) (2.07) (2.05) (1.47) (0.74) (1.00) 
SD_RETt-1 -0.799** 1.668* 0.445 -0.921*** -1.422* -0.725** 
 (-2.13) (1.91) (1.16) (-2.66) (-1.80) (-2.11) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.0180 0.220** 0.090** -0.0310 -0.118 -0.044 
 (-0.46) (2.32) (2.16) (-0.93) (-1.53) (-1.33) 
Intercept -0.143*** -1.370*** -0.717*** -0.171*** -1.336*** -0.694*** 
 (-4.01) (-16.80) (-20.28) (-5.25) (-17.35) (-20.21) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 28,115 28,115 28,115 28,947 28,947 28,947 
R-Squared 0.017 0.038 0.046 0.025 0.051 0.061 
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Panel C: Firm innovation 
 Low Firm Innovation High Firm Innovation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt 
RegIndext -0.000 0.009 0.003 0.011*** 0.023** 0.011** 
 (-0.01) (0.94) (0.68) (2.65) (2.17) (2.19) 
ROAt -0.176*** -0.524*** -0.208*** -0.074*** -0.238*** -0.096*** 
 (-6.98) (-8.97) (-8.07) (-4.85) (-6.86) (-6.30) 
SIZEt-1 0.055*** 0.233*** 0.112*** 0.057*** 0.222*** 0.106*** 
 (12.92) (22.71) (24.74) (14.64) (24.52) (26.51) 
LEVt-1 0.067*** 0.130** 0.049** -0.012 -0.024 -0.023 
 (2.81) (2.37) (1.99) (-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.98) 
MBt-1 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.001** 
 (0.49) (1.55) (1.27) (0.51) (2.43) (2.22) 
DTURNt-1 0.008*** 0.016** 0.007** 0.005** 0.004 0.002 
 (2.63) (2.47) (2.47) (2.22) (0.73) (0.88) 
SD_RETt-1 -1.103*** -1.268 -0.823** -0.297 1.298* 0.446 
 (-3.26) (-1.57) (-2.34) (-0.88) (1.66) (1.29) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.055 -0.119 -0.061 0.028 0.172** 0.078** 
 (-1.64) (-1.39) (-1.64) (0.89) (2.28) (2.35) 
Intercept -0.148*** -1.344*** -0.694*** -0.184*** -1.360*** -0.714*** 
 (-4.54) (-17.56) (-20.37) (-5.67) (-17.45) (-20.69) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 28,758 28,758 28,758 28,304 28,304 28,304 
R-Squared 0.020 0.046 0.055 0.022 0.045 0.054 
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Table 6. Bank competition and intense adverse information divulging 
The dependent variables SURP_UE and SURP_G are indicators for the incidence of abrupt releasing of 
extremely negative information via earnings announcements and managerial earnings guidance, respectively. 
The key independent variable is the IBBEA deregulation index RegIndex. Firm and trading characteristic 
variables are controlled as in Eq. (4). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The 
regression coefficients on independent variables are reported, followed by the robust t-statistics (in the 
parentheses) based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients on the firm 
and year dummies are not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 SURP_UEt SURP_Gt 
RegIndext 0.008** 0.006** 
 (2.01) (2.50) 
ROAt 0.0280 -0.338*** 
 (1.19) (-23.93) 
SIZEt-1 0.073*** 0.032*** 
 (16.53) (15.53) 
LEVt-1 0.00200 -0.078*** 
 (0.10) (-6.78) 
MBt-1 0.00100 -0.001** 
 (1.50) (-2.56) 
DTURNt-1 0.006** 0.009*** 
 (1.98) (5.97) 
SD_RETt-1 -0.849** 0.0340 
 (-2.17) (0.20) 
MEAN_RETt-1 -0.114** 0.0170 
 (-2.57) (0.95) 
Intercept -0.494*** -0.136*** 
 (-12.43) (-7.69) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
No. of Observations 30,324 57,062 
R-Squared 0.145 0.182 
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Table 7. Bank competition and earnings management and reporting quality 
The dependent variable Accrual_EM refers to accrual-based earnings management, Real_EM1 and Real_EM2 
are two real earnings management measures, and Restatement indicates the occurrence of accounting restatement. 
The key independent variable is the IBBEA deregulation index RegIndex. Firm characteristic variables are 
controlled as in Eq. (6). Details about the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The regression 
coefficients on independent variables are reported, followed by the robust t-statistics (in the parentheses) based 
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. For brevity, the coefficients on the firm and year dummies are 
not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Accrual_EMt Real_EM1t Real_EM2t Restatementt 
RegIndext 0.002** 0.011** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (2.22) (2.01) (2.15) (1.99) 
SIZEt 0.006*** -0.053*** -0.044*** 0.008*** 
 (6.90) (-10.55) (-12.43) (3.25) 
ROAt 0.034*** 0.270*** 0.077*** -0.004 
 (8.79) (9.59) (3.76) (-0.49) 
BIG4t -0.006** 0.040*** 0.032*** -0.012 
 (-2.54) (3.22) (3.84) (-1.40) 
MBt 0.000* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.65) (-1.58) (-1.52) (1.13) 
NOAt-1 -0.024*** 0.088*** 0.042*** 0.005 
 (-16.24) (11.42) (7.89) (0.93) 
IOt 0.009** 0.055*** 0.031*** -0.005 
 (2.56) (3.53) (2.87) (-0.41) 
LEVt -0.015*** -0.157*** -0.129*** 0.004 
 (-4.90) (-7.50) (-8.20) (0.56) 
CRt 0.000 0.008*** 0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.89) (3.47) (1.17) (-0.97) 
Intercept -0.011* 0.224*** 0.196*** -0.004 
 (-1.85) (7.12) (8.92) (-0.26) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 73,710 73,710 73,710 42,502 
R-Squared 0.018 0.045 0.031 0.058 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
